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Tác giả CN
| REN, Wei. | |
Nhan đề
| 先党后军:中共早期与“枪杆子”关系考论 = The Party prior to the Army: “Gun Barrel”and the CPC in Its Early Years. /REN Wei. | |
Thông tin xuất bản
| 2014 | |
Mô tả vật lý
| 85-100 p. | |
Tùng thư
| 南京大学 | |
Tóm tắt
| 中共早期因师法苏俄和接受苏俄"先党后军"的指示,未能积极注意军事,待北伐推进,国民党武装坐大,中共方感受到危机,开始关注"枪杆子"问题,并试图有所补救。但在国共合作的局面下,中共始终未能组建自己的党军。零星而边缘化的军事尝试并不成功。然而,在此过程中形成的有关军事武力的认知与构想并非没有意义。从短期看,中共因忽视军事而遭致的打击几乎是致命的;但从革命长程观察,中共注重组织、宣传和群众运动却具有全局性和长远的意义。后来被誉为"三大法宝"的"统一战线"、"武装斗争"与"党的建设"中,至少有两大法宝是在陈独秀时期奠定的。若以1927年为视点,苏俄的"先党后军"路径显然是中共早期革命顿挫的要因;若以1949年为视点,则苏俄的"先党后军"路径又似乎是中共革命最终成功的不二之途。 | |
Tóm tắt
| Modeling itself on Soviet Russia and accepting the principle that"party takes priority over army"in the early years,the Communist Party of China(CPC) failed to build up its military force. Not until the military forces of the Nationalist Party were growing stronger during the Northern Expedition did the CPC realize the crisis to be imposed on,and began to take into serious consideration of the gunbarrel issue. Being in co-operation with the Nationalist Party,however,the CPC was unable to form its own army,and non-systematic efforts in this respect amounted seemingly to almost nothing. Nevertheless,there appeared,in this attempt,profound realization and conception concerning communist military forces. Although the CPC suffered a devastating frustration due to its neglect of military,its capability in organization,publicity,and mass mobilization developed in the past turned out to be more significant in the long run. The foundation of two of the principles that have been later hailed as the three magic weapons — united front,armed struggle and party building — was laid down during the period of Chen Duxiu’s leadership. Observed from the unfavorable situation in1927,the model of"party takes priority over army,"introduced from Soviet Russia,was obviously the number one criminal for the setbacks suffered by the CPC in its early years. When observed from the favorable situation in 1949,however,the model seems to be one and the only way to the CPC’s ultimate victory of revolution. | |
Từ khóa tự do
| 共产国际. | |
Từ khóa tự do
| 兵士运动. | |
Từ khóa tự do
| 国共合作. | |
Từ khóa tự do
| 枪杆子. | |
Nguồn trích
| Journal of Nanjing University: Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences- 2014, Vol. 51, No. 5. | |
Nguồn trích
| 南京大学学报 : 哲学社会科学- 2014, 第一卷 |
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| 100 | 0 |aREN, Wei. |
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| 245 | 10|a先党后军:中共早期与“枪杆子”关系考论 =|bThe Party prior to the Army: “Gun Barrel”and the CPC in Its Early Years. /|cREN Wei. |
|---|
| 260 | |c2014 |
|---|
| 300 | |a85-100 p. |
|---|
| 362 | 0 |aVol. 51, No. 5 (2014) |
|---|
| 490 | 0 |a南京大学 |
|---|
| 520 | |a中共早期因师法苏俄和接受苏俄"先党后军"的指示,未能积极注意军事,待北伐推进,国民党武装坐大,中共方感受到危机,开始关注"枪杆子"问题,并试图有所补救。但在国共合作的局面下,中共始终未能组建自己的党军。零星而边缘化的军事尝试并不成功。然而,在此过程中形成的有关军事武力的认知与构想并非没有意义。从短期看,中共因忽视军事而遭致的打击几乎是致命的;但从革命长程观察,中共注重组织、宣传和群众运动却具有全局性和长远的意义。后来被誉为"三大法宝"的"统一战线"、"武装斗争"与"党的建设"中,至少有两大法宝是在陈独秀时期奠定的。若以1927年为视点,苏俄的"先党后军"路径显然是中共早期革命顿挫的要因;若以1949年为视点,则苏俄的"先党后军"路径又似乎是中共革命最终成功的不二之途。 |
|---|
| 520 | 0 |aModeling itself on Soviet Russia and accepting the principle that"party takes priority over army"in the early years,the Communist Party of China(CPC) failed to build up its military force. Not until the military forces of the Nationalist Party were growing stronger during the Northern Expedition did the CPC realize the crisis to be imposed on,and began to take into serious consideration of the gunbarrel issue. Being in co-operation with the Nationalist Party,however,the CPC was unable to form its own army,and non-systematic efforts in this respect amounted seemingly to almost nothing. Nevertheless,there appeared,in this attempt,profound realization and conception concerning communist military forces. Although the CPC suffered a devastating frustration due to its neglect of military,its capability in organization,publicity,and mass mobilization developed in the past turned out to be more significant in the long run. The foundation of two of the principles that have been later hailed as the three magic weapons — united front,armed struggle and party building — was laid down during the period of Chen Duxiu’s leadership. Observed from the unfavorable situation in1927,the model of"party takes priority over army,"introduced from Soviet Russia,was obviously the number one criminal for the setbacks suffered by the CPC in its early years. When observed from the favorable situation in 1949,however,the model seems to be one and the only way to the CPC’s ultimate victory of revolution. |
|---|
| 653 | 0 |a共产国际. |
|---|
| 653 | 0 |a兵士运动. |
|---|
| 653 | 0 |a国共合作. |
|---|
| 653 | 0 |a枪杆子. |
|---|
| 773 | |tJournal of Nanjing University: Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences|g2014, Vol. 51, No. 5. |
|---|
| 773 | |t南京大学学报 : 哲学社会科学|g2014, 第一卷 |
|---|
| 890 | |a0|b0|c0|d0 |
|---|
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