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Optimism and auditor liability / Jochen Bigus
// Acounting and business research 2016, Vol46, N.6 p577-p601 There is strong evidence that individuals are optimistic in the sense that they underrate the probability of a negative event occurring. This paper provides a positive theoretical analysis of how auditor optimism affects their incentives to take care under two liability rules: strict liability and a negligence rule. Under strict liability, auditors are held liable when they cause damages to investors. Under a negligence rule, auditors are held liable when they cause damages and in addition, act negligently, that is, fail to meet the standard of due care specified in legal and professional rules. I find the following results. (1) If due care is sufficiently close to the efficient level, a negligence rule distorts auditors’ incentives less than strict liability. Under strict liability, optimism makes the auditor overestimate the chances of finding material mistakes and thus induces suboptimal care. (2) If due care is too strict, the auditor will not exert due care but the same level of suboptimal care under either liability rule. (3) With increasing optimism and in the absence of punitive damages, strict liability becomes less preferable to a precise negligence rule. This statement also holds for vaguely defined standards of due care if due care is sufficiently strict or if auditor optimism is sufficiently high. (4) Punitive damages counteract suboptimal incentives generated by auditor optimism, especially under strict liability
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食品安全私人执法研究——以惩罚性赔偿型消费公益诉讼为中心 = Study on Private Enforcement of Food Safety / 黄忠顺.
// Wuhan University Journal(Philosophy & Social Sciences) Vol 68, No.4 (2015). 湖北省武汉市 : 双月, 201584-92 p. Public enforcement system has been strengthened in the new"Food Safety Law",while private enforcement system has not yet attracted the attention of legislators.As private enforcement performs indispensable and complementary functions,we should strengthen the system construction of the consumer public interest litigation through judicial interpretation.Consumer public interest litigation for punitive damages makes operators’ external costs and consumers’ positive externality internalized and reduces the incentive cost of private enforcement.In order to have the scale effect of punitive damages litigation realized,consumers might transfer both compensatory and punitive claims to some consumers’ association with qualification to file public interest litigation.
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