|
Dòng
|
Nội dung
|
|
1
|
Analysts’ earnings forecasts: coexistence and dynamics of overconfidence and strategic incentives / Katrien Bosqueta, Peter de Goeijb* & Kristien Smedtsc.
// Accounting and Business Research. Volume 45, N3, 2015. London, Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales] Abingdon, UK : Routledge, Taylor & Francis , 2015.pages 307-322. This paper formulates a two-stage model to capture the decision process of financial analysts when issuing earnings forecasts. Our model extends the model of Chen and Jiang [(2005). Analysts’ weighting of private and public information. Review of Financial Studies, 19 (1), 319–355], by allowing for a distortion of forecasts independent of whether an analyst has private information. Using quarterly earnings forecasts, we provide empirical evidence on the coexistence of overconfidence and strategic incentives. Financial analysts overweight their private information and at the same time strategically inflate their forecast.
|
|
2
|
The coverage assignments of financial analysts : Tristan Roger.
// Accounting and Business Research Vol.48, No.6 2018.p. 651-673. Previous studies document that forecast accuracy impacts analyst career outcomes. This paper investigates the influence of forecast accuracy on coverage assignments. I show that brokerage houses reward accurate analysts by assigning them to high-profile firms and penalise analysts exhibiting poor accuracy by assigning them to smaller firms. The coverage of high-profile firms increases the potential for future compensation linked to investment banking and trading commissions. In addition, covering such firms increases analysts recognition from buy-side investors, which, in turn, increases the likelihood of obtaining broker votes and votes for the Institutional Investor star ranking. Overall, my results indicate that high forecast accuracy leads to increased future compensation.
|
|
|
|
|