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Derivatives disclosure in corporate annual reports: bank analysts perceptions of usefulness / Anne Beana & Helen Irvine.
// Accounting and Business Research. Volume 45, N5, 2015. London, Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales] Abingdon, UK : Routledge, Taylor & Francis , 2015.pages 602-619. Responding to mixed evidence on the decision-usefulness of annual report disclosures for derivative financial instruments to capital market participants, and concerns identified by practice, this paper examines usefulness in a direct study of user perceptions. Interviews with analysts from Australia s four major banks reveal essential usefulness, limited by the disclosures failure to reflect companies actual use of derivatives throughout the period, and inability of users to understand companies off-balance sheet risk and risk management practices from information considered generic and boilerplate. The research complements and extends existing archival and survey research and provides new evidence suggesting low-cost ways for increasing usefulness. It supports the International Accounting Standards Board s disclosure recommendations in its recent Discussion Paper: A Review of the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting, but, at the same time, highlights that for these proposed measures to be successful in relation to IFRS 7, they may need to address other issues. The research increases knowledge of the informational requirements of lenders, an important class of financial information user, and supports calls from practice for companies to improve their disclosure of material economic risks.
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Does obfuscating excessive CEO pay work? The influence of remuneration report readability on say-on-pay votes / Reggy Hooghiemstra, Yu Flora Kuang, Bo Qin ORCID Icon
// Accounting and Business Research Volume 47, 2017 - Issue 6 2017.p. 695-729. This paper assesses whether reducing ‘readability’ is an effective obfuscation strategy for influencing the level of shareholder say-on-pay voting dissent in firms with excessive CEO pay. Based on a sample of UK-listed firms, our results indicate that in cases of excessive CEO pay, a less readable remuneration report is associated with reduced say-on-pay voting dissent. However, the effect of the obfuscation strategy diminishes as institutional ownership increases. Using obscurely written remuneration reports may even backfire (i.e. associated with increased voting dissent) when a firm’s majority shares are held by institutional investors. Our results are robust to controlling for compensation contract complexity as well as other alternative explanations. The results are also robust to various controls for endogeneity including a two-stage instrumental variable approach and propensity-score matching. Our findings offer regulatory implications that regulators could minimize the use of ‘obfuscation’ in pay-related disclosures by prescribing how information is to be presented.
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Does obfuscating excessive CEO pay work? The influence of remuneration report readability on say-on-pay votes/ Reggy Hooghiemstra, Yu Flora Kuang, Bo Qin
// Accounting and Business Research vol.47, no. 6/2017 2017.p. 695 - 729. This paper assesses whether reducing ‘readability’ is an effective obfuscation strategy for influencing the level of shareholder say-on-pay voting dissent in firms with excessive CEO pay. Based on a sample of UK-listed firms, our results indicate that in cases of excessive CEO pay, a less readable remuneration report is associated with reduced say-on-pay voting dissent. However, the effect of the obfuscation strategy diminishes as institutional ownership increases. Using obscurely written remuneration reports may even backfire (i.e. associated with increased voting dissent) when a firm’s majority shares are held by institutional investors. Our results are robust to controlling for compensation contract complexity as well as other alternative explanations. The results are also robust to various controls for endogeneity including a two-stage instrumental variable approach and propensity-score matching. Our findings offer regulatory implications that regulators could minimize the use of ‘obfuscation’ in pay-related disclosures by prescribing how information is to be presented.
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Reporting practice, impression management and company performance: a longitudinal and comparative analysis of water leakage disclosure / Stuart Coopera & Richard Slack.
// Accounting and Business Research. Volume 45, N6-7, 2015. London, Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales] Abingdon, UK : Routledge, Taylor & Francis , 2015.pages 801-840. This paper aims to determine whether corporate reporting practice, consistent with impression management, changes depending upon company performance. A longitudinal analysis, rarely used in prior impression management research, enables changes in annual report disclosures, both narrative and visual, to be identified and considered relative to a company s performance. Our analysis is based upon the disclosure of leakage performance, a strategic and stakeholder issue in the water industry, by all 10 water and sewerage companies (WASCs) in England and Wales over the 7-year period 2005–2006 to 2011–2012. Our longitudinal data are also compared across companies and contrasted with the expert counter account provided by the industry regulator, OFWAT. We find that the level, nature and presentation of a WASC s leakage disclosures change markedly reflective of their performance against OFWAT s target. Our evidence shows that the changes in reporting practice include the use of tactics and presentational methods consistent with impression management, raising concerns regarding the balance and trustworthiness of voluntary disclosures in the annual report. We suggest that the International Accounting Standards Board should further consider their guidance on narrative disclosures, including presentational format, to reduce the scope for impression management within corporate reporting.
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Why regulate private firm disclosure and auditing? / Michael Minnis, Nemit Shroff.
// Accounting and Business Research Volume 47, 2017 - Issue 5 2017.p. 473-502. Private firms face differing financial disclosure and auditing regulations around the world. In the US and Canada, for example, private firms are generally neither required to disclose their financial results nor have their financial statements audited. By contrast, many firms with limited liability in most other countries are required to file at least some financial information publicly and are also required to have their financial statements audited. This paper discusses and analyzes the reasons for differential financial reporting regulation of private firms. We first discuss various definitions of a private firm. Next, we examine theoretical arguments for regulating the financial reporting of these firms, particularly related to public disclosure and auditing. We then provide new survey-based evidence of firms’ and standard setters’ views of regulation. We conclude by identifying future research opportunities.
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