- Bài trích
- Nhan đề: 人格主义态度与现象学的开端问题——基于胡塞尔《观念》Ⅱ的研究 =
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Tác giả CN
| CHEN, Wei. | |
Nhan đề
| 人格主义态度与现象学的开端问题——基于胡塞尔《观念》Ⅱ的研究 = Personalistic Attitude and the Beginning-problem of Phenomenology: A Study Based on Husserl’s Ideen Ⅱ. /CHEN Wei. | |
Thông tin xuất bản
| 2014 | |
Mô tả vật lý
| tr. 107-113. | |
Tùng thư
| 南京大学 | |
Tóm tắt
| Husserl based his Peron-study on the contraposition of personalistic attitude and naturalistic attitude. The personalistic attitude differs from the naturalistic attitude in their understanding of the relationship between the subject and the world: while the former regards it as an intentional relationship,the latter,a real one. In the perspective of the theory of constitution,two kinds of Persons can be distinguished: the apperceptive Person who apprehends the self-perception and other-perception,and the Person as rational subject who has the history of self-development. From the perspective of phenomenological methodology,the personalistic attitude is a non-Cartesian approach to transcendental phenomenology; and,from the perspective of phenomenological idea about philosophy,it is an approach to the teleological process of rational self-illumination and personal self-reflection. | |
Tóm tắt
| 胡塞尔在《观念》Ⅱ中的人格研究是在人格主义态度和自然主义态度相对峙的框架中进行的,与自然主义态度将人与世界的关系理解为实在关系不同,人格主义态度将其理解为意向关系;从构造论的角度可以区分出两种人格:一种是在其自身感知以及他人感知中被把握到的统觉性人格,另一种是作为理性主体的人格,后者具有其自身生成的历史。从超越论现象学方法论的角度看,人格主义态度是通达超越论现象学的一种非笛卡尔式的开端,从现象学的哲学理念的角度看,人格主义态度是理性的自身阐明和人格的自身沉思之目的论进程的开端。 | |
Từ khóa tự do
| 理性. | |
Từ khóa tự do
| "concept" Ⅱ. | |
Từ khóa tự do
| 《观念》Ⅱ. | |
Từ khóa tự do
| Personalism attitude. | |
Từ khóa tự do
| Rationality. | |
Từ khóa tự do
| 人格主义态度. | |
Nguồn trích
| Journal of Nanjing University: Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences- 2014, Vol. 51, No. 3. | |
Nguồn trích
| 南京大学学报 : 哲学社会科学- 2014, 第一卷 |
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| 100 | 0 |aCHEN, Wei. |
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| 245 | 10|a人格主义态度与现象学的开端问题——基于胡塞尔《观念》Ⅱ的研究 =|bPersonalistic Attitude and the Beginning-problem of Phenomenology: A Study Based on Husserl’s Ideen Ⅱ. /|cCHEN Wei. |
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| 260 | |c2014 |
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| 300 | |atr. 107-113. |
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| 362 | 0 |aVol. 51, No. 3 (Mar. 2014) |
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| 490 | 0 |a南京大学 |
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| 520 | |aHusserl based his Peron-study on the contraposition of personalistic attitude and naturalistic attitude. The personalistic attitude differs from the naturalistic attitude in their understanding of the relationship between the subject and the world: while the former regards it as an intentional relationship,the latter,a real one. In the perspective of the theory of constitution,two kinds of Persons can be distinguished: the apperceptive Person who apprehends the self-perception and other-perception,and the Person as rational subject who has the history of self-development. From the perspective of phenomenological methodology,the personalistic attitude is a non-Cartesian approach to transcendental phenomenology; and,from the perspective of phenomenological idea about philosophy,it is an approach to the teleological process of rational self-illumination and personal self-reflection. |
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| 520 | |a胡塞尔在《观念》Ⅱ中的人格研究是在人格主义态度和自然主义态度相对峙的框架中进行的,与自然主义态度将人与世界的关系理解为实在关系不同,人格主义态度将其理解为意向关系;从构造论的角度可以区分出两种人格:一种是在其自身感知以及他人感知中被把握到的统觉性人格,另一种是作为理性主体的人格,后者具有其自身生成的历史。从超越论现象学方法论的角度看,人格主义态度是通达超越论现象学的一种非笛卡尔式的开端,从现象学的哲学理念的角度看,人格主义态度是理性的自身阐明和人格的自身沉思之目的论进程的开端。 |
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| 653 | 0 |a理性. |
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| 653 | 0 |a"concept" Ⅱ. |
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| 653 | 0 |a《观念》Ⅱ. |
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| 653 | 0 |aPersonalism attitude. |
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| 653 | 0 |aRationality. |
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| 653 | 0 |a人格主义态度. |
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| 773 | |tJournal of Nanjing University: Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences|g2014, Vol. 51, No. 3. |
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| 773 | |t南京大学学报 : 哲学社会科学|g2014, 第一卷 |
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| 890 | |a0|b0|c0|d0 |
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