Tác giả CN
| Roger, Tristan. |
Nhan đề
| The coverage assignments of financial analysts : Tristan Roger. |
Thông tin xuất bản
| 2018. |
Mô tả vật lý
| p. 651-673. |
Tóm tắt
| Previous studies document that forecast accuracy impacts analyst career outcomes. This paper investigates the influence of forecast accuracy on coverage assignments. I show that brokerage houses reward accurate analysts by assigning them to high-profile firms and penalise analysts exhibiting poor accuracy by assigning them to smaller firms. The coverage of high-profile firms increases the potential for future compensation linked to investment banking and trading commissions. In addition, covering such firms increases analysts recognition from buy-side investors, which, in turn, increases the likelihood of obtaining broker votes and votes for the Institutional Investor star ranking. Overall, my results indicate that high forecast accuracy leads to increased future compensation. |
Đề mục chủ đề
| International Finance--Insurance. |
Đề mục chủ đề
| Tài chính quốc tế--Bảo hiểm. |
Thuật ngữ không kiểm soát
| Phân tích tài chính |
Thuật ngữ không kiểm soát
| Dự đoán |
Thuật ngữ không kiểm soát
| Financial analysts |
Thuật ngữ không kiểm soát
| Nghề nghiệp |
Thuật ngữ không kiểm soát
| Career concerns |
Thuật ngữ không kiểm soát
| Coverage decisions |
Thuật ngữ không kiểm soát
| Forecast accuracy |
Nguồn trích
| Accounting and Business Research - Vol.48, No.6 |
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100 | 1 |aRoger, Tristan. |
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245 | 10|aThe coverage assignments of financial analysts : |bTristan Roger. |
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260 | |c2018. |
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300 | 10|ap. 651-673. |
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520 | |aPrevious studies document that forecast accuracy impacts analyst career outcomes. This paper investigates the influence of forecast accuracy on coverage assignments. I show that brokerage houses reward accurate analysts by assigning them to high-profile firms and penalise analysts exhibiting poor accuracy by assigning them to smaller firms. The coverage of high-profile firms increases the potential for future compensation linked to investment banking and trading commissions. In addition, covering such firms increases analysts recognition from buy-side investors, which, in turn, increases the likelihood of obtaining broker votes and votes for the Institutional Investor star ranking. Overall, my results indicate that high forecast accuracy leads to increased future compensation. |
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650 | 10|aInternational Finance|xInsurance. |
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650 | 10|aTài chính quốc tế|xBảo hiểm. |
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653 | 0 |aPhân tích tài chính |
---|
653 | 0 |aDự đoán |
---|
653 | 0 |aFinancial analysts |
---|
653 | 0 |aNghề nghiệp |
---|
653 | 0 |aCareer concerns |
---|
653 | 0 |aCoverage decisions |
---|
653 | 0 |aForecast accuracy |
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773 | |tAccounting and Business Research |gVol.48, No.6 |
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890 | |a0|b0|c0|d0 |
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