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Tác giả CN
| Han Ink, Emily A. | |
Nhan đề
| Marking imprecision, conveying surprise: Like between hedging and mirativity / Emily A. Han Ink. | |
Thông tin xuất bản
| 2019. | |
Mô tả vật lý
| p. 1-34. | |
Tóm tắt
| Mirative expressions, which mark surprising information (DeLancey 1997), are often
expressed through linguistic forms that are also used to encode other, seemingly unrelated,
meanings – e.g. evidential markers that mark lack of direct evidence (Turkish: Slobin
& Aksu 1982, Peterson 2010; Cheyenne: Rett & Murray 2013; Cuzco Quechua: Faller
2002; Ostyak: Nikolaeva 1999; among others). In this paper, we show that the English
particle like features a parallel polysemy between a mirative use and its better-known
hedging use, which expresses weakened commitment to the strict denotation of a linguistic
expression. After presenting several diagnostics that point to a genuine empirical difference
between the hedging and mirative functions of like, we propose that both uses widen the
size of a contextually restricted set, admitting elements that were previously excluded.
More specifically, hedging like expands the set of ‘similar enough’ interpretations that
we can apply to a linguistic expression in a context, including interpretations that we
would normally consider to be too different from the context at hand. Mirative like, on the
other hand, expands the set of worlds that we are willing to consider as candidates for the
actual world in the conversation, resulting in the inclusion of worlds that interlocutors have
previously ruled out due to perceived outlandishness. We therefore suggest that the two
uses are best treated as sharing a common semantic kernel, deriving hedging and mirativity
as effects of the particular type of object to which like applies. | |
Đề mục chủ đề
| Linguistics--Making imprecision | |
Thuật ngữ không kiểm soát
| Polysemy | |
Thuật ngữ không kiểm soát
| Hedging | |
Thuật ngữ không kiểm soát
| Evidentiality | |
Thuật ngữ không kiểm soát
| Mirativity | |
Thuật ngữ không kiểm soát
| Common ground | |
Thuật ngữ không kiểm soát
| Discourse particles | |
Nguồn trích
| Journal of Linguistics- Vol. 55- Issue 1/2019 |
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| 100 | 0 |aHan Ink, Emily A. |
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| 245 | 10|aMarking imprecision, conveying surprise: Like between hedging and mirativity / |cEmily A. Han Ink. |
|---|
| 260 | |c2019. |
|---|
| 300 | 0|ap. 1-34. |
|---|
| 520 | |aMirative expressions, which mark surprising information (DeLancey 1997), are often
expressed through linguistic forms that are also used to encode other, seemingly unrelated,
meanings – e.g. evidential markers that mark lack of direct evidence (Turkish: Slobin
& Aksu 1982, Peterson 2010; Cheyenne: Rett & Murray 2013; Cuzco Quechua: Faller
2002; Ostyak: Nikolaeva 1999; among others). In this paper, we show that the English
particle like features a parallel polysemy between a mirative use and its better-known
hedging use, which expresses weakened commitment to the strict denotation of a linguistic
expression. After presenting several diagnostics that point to a genuine empirical difference
between the hedging and mirative functions of like, we propose that both uses widen the
size of a contextually restricted set, admitting elements that were previously excluded.
More specifically, hedging like expands the set of ‘similar enough’ interpretations that
we can apply to a linguistic expression in a context, including interpretations that we
would normally consider to be too different from the context at hand. Mirative like, on the
other hand, expands the set of worlds that we are willing to consider as candidates for the
actual world in the conversation, resulting in the inclusion of worlds that interlocutors have
previously ruled out due to perceived outlandishness. We therefore suggest that the two
uses are best treated as sharing a common semantic kernel, deriving hedging and mirativity
as effects of the particular type of object to which like applies. |
|---|
| 650 | 14|aLinguistics|xMaking imprecision |
|---|
| 653 | 0|aPolysemy |
|---|
| 653 | 0|aHedging |
|---|
| 653 | 0|aEvidentiality |
|---|
| 653 | 0|aMirativity |
|---|
| 653 | 0|aCommon ground |
|---|
| 653 | 0|aDiscourse particles |
|---|
| 773 | 0 |tJournal of Linguistics|gVol. 55- Issue 1/2019 |
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