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/ Ahsan Habib & Md. Borhan Uddin Bhuiyan
// Acounting and business research 2016, Vol46, N.2 p121-p144 The objective of this paper is to examine empirically the consequences for financial reporting quality of having audit committees that include problem directors, that is, directors with prior involvement in corporate bankruptcies, major accounting restatements, or other accounting scandals. An ordinary least squares regression model is used to examine the association between problem directors on the audit committee and financial reporting quality as proxied by accruals and real earnings management. Results reveal that there is a positive association between the presence of problem directors on the audit committee and real earnings management, and this association is more pronounced in cases where those problem directors have been involved in prior instances of accounting restatements and fraudulent reporting practices
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Regulatory incentives and financial reporting quality in public healthcare organisations / Margaret J. Greenwood, Lei Tao, Richard M. Baylis
// Accounting and Business Research Volume 47, 2017 - Issue 7 2017.p. 831-855. English National Health Service Foundation Trusts are subject to a regulatory regime in which the level of monitoring and intervention is determined by performance against two key performance metrics: a ‘financial risk rating’, based on a number of performance metrics, such as the reported surplus margin and return on assets, and a ‘prudential borrowing limit’. In this paper, we investigate the variation in financial reporting quality, proxied by discretionary accruals, with the incentives introduced by this regime. We find: first, that discretionary accruals are managed to report small surpluses; second, that, consistent with the avoidance of regulatory intervention in both the short and medium term, discretionary accruals are more positive when pre-managed performance is below intervention triggering thresholds and more negative when well above threshold; third, that, despite a move away from financial breakeven as the primary performance objective, there remains an aversion to small loss reporting. We further find that the level of discretionary accruals is driven by two metrics of strategic significance: the surplus margin (a measure of retained earnings) and the prudential borrowing limit (a measure of borrowing capacity).
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Regulatory incentives and financial reporting quality in public healthcare organisations / Margaret J. Greenwood, Richard M. Baylis & Lei Tao
// Accounting and Business Research Volume 47, 2017 - Issue 7 2017.p. 831-855. English National Health Service Foundation Trusts are subject to a regulatory regime in which the level of monitoring and intervention is determined by performance against two key performance metrics: a ‘financial risk rating’, based on a number of performance metrics, such as the reported surplus margin and return on assets, and a ‘prudential borrowing limit’. In this paper, we investigate the variation in financial reporting quality, proxied by discretionary accruals, with the incentives introduced by this regime. We find: first, that discretionary accruals are managed to report small surpluses; second, that, consistent with the avoidance of regulatory intervention in both the short and medium term, discretionary accruals are more positive when pre-managed performance is below intervention triggering thresholds and more negative when well above threshold; third, that, despite a move away from financial breakeven as the primary performance objective, there remains an aversion to small loss reporting. We further find that the level of discretionary accruals is driven by two metrics of strategic significance: the surplus margin (a measure of retained earnings) and the prudential borrowing limit (a measure of borrowing capacity).
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The interaction effects of firm and partner tenure on audit quality / Josep Garcia-Blandon, Josep Maria Argiles-Bosch
// Accounting and Business Research Volume 47, 2017 - Issue 7 2017.p. 810-830. This paper investigates the impact of firm and partner tenure on audit quality, where audit quality is proxied by discretionary accruals. We study a sample of Spanish listed companies between 2005 and 2011 and address both the individual and the interaction effects of firm and partner tenure. Our study is motivated by the current debate, particularly intense at the EU level, on the impact of the auditor rotation regime on the quality of auditing. We find that, without considering the interaction effects, firm and partner tenure do not seem to play a relevant role as determinants of audit quality. Importantly, the interaction of firm and partner tenure shows stronger effects on audit quality than both forms of tenure separately considered. Finally, our analysis suggests that audit quality is maximized when medium firm and partner tenures interact. However, results for the interaction variables are sensitive to the accruals estimation method.
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