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《荀子》的“类”与道的范畴化发展 = Xunzi’s Thinking on Lei and the Categorization of Dao in the Pre-Qin China. / JIANG Chong-yue.
// Journal of Nanjing University: Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences 2014, Vol. 51, No. 4.
// 南京大学学报 : 哲学社会科学 2014, 第一卷 2014tr. 99-112. Hegel says,in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy,that the Chinese have a great reputation for their culture; but they have nophilosophy in a strict sense.As the supreme essence,Dao is put forward,and yet is the universality of an abstract kind.In its switch from the abstract to the concrete,the concept Dao fails to leave any space for the Chinese to create a kingdom of categorization.But,is he justified in saying so? It is Xunzi’s idea on Lei that can give an answer to this question.Xunzi thinks that Dao can be grasped from various aspects,so-named as Lei( the Chinese counterpart to the western concept of category).He goes further that Li( the Chinese counterpart to the western conceptof reason) is determined by Lei,where Li( reason) stays.And the reasons in concrete things are different as long as Lei,the categories they stay within,are different.Dao obtains its categories or determinations when it switches from the abstract to the concrete.The purpose of his epistemology of Jiebi( removing the obstacle of one-sided view) is to know the Daos of the concrete things.His theory of Zhengming( the rectification of names) insists that each Lei has a corresponding name.When the Lei is different,its name must be different,too.Obviously he deals with the concrete things through the categorical concepts.He even maintains that thinking on Lei should be based on feeling and experience.Therefore,his thought can be classified into empirical philosophy.Xunzi’s thinking on Lei just stands between Laozi’s Dao and Han Feizi’s Dao-Li theory.It strongly proves that the ancient Chinese do have the potentiality to build up a categorical kingdom.Nevertheless,it must not be denied that,compared with the ancient Greek philosophy,the Chinese philosophy is weaker in conceptual and categorical thinking,due to the strong influence of its political utilitarianism.
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改造性批判与历史发生学批判——关于马克思《黑格尔法哲学批判》之“批判”概念辨正 = Criticisms of Transformative and Histogenetic Nature:A Study of the Conception of Criticisms in Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. / ZHU Xue-ping.
// Journal of Nanjing University: Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences 2014, Vol. 51, No. 4.
// 南京大学学报 : 哲学社会科学 2014, 第一卷 2014tr. 23-34. "改造性批判"和"心理—发生学批判"构成了费尔巴哈"批判"概念的两面,只有由此出发,方可真正领会到费尔巴哈宗教批判(及其对思辨哲学的批判)的真正本质。同样,也只有由此出发,才能更好地领会马克思《黑格尔法哲学批判》中的"批判"概念。费尔巴哈的"批判"概念对马克思《黑格尔法哲学批判》一文的"批判"概念产生了决定性的影响,这种影响不仅体现在"改造性批判"上,也同样体现在作为费尔巴哈"改造性批判"的另一面——"发生学批判"中,而马克思的"历史—发生学批判"其实是源自费尔巴哈的"心理—发生学批判"。从马克思《黑格尔法哲学批判》中的"批判"概念与费尔巴哈的"批判"概念之间的内在关联,可以清晰地看出马克思与费尔巴哈之间的思想联系及其未来走向:对费尔巴哈的"改造性批判"的接受和运用表现了马克思对费尔巴哈唯物主义的接受;对"发生学批判"的接纳和改造则使马克思进一步转向了社会历史领域的研究,从而为日后超越费尔巴哈、创建历史唯物主义埋下了伏笔。
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试说《老子》之“道”及其中含蕴的历史观 = Dao in Laozi and Its Philosophy of History. / LIU Jia-he.
// Journal of Nanjing University: Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences 2014, Vol. 51, No. 4.
// 南京大学学报 : 哲学社会科学 2014, 第一卷 2014tr. 87-98. With the examination of its inner coherence,Dao in Laozi can be comprehended in terms of the contradictions in its historical development.Dao can be a constant Dao that cannot be told of,or a non-constant Dao that can be told of.By the same token,a name can be a constant name that cannot be named or a non-constant name that can be named.The positive and the negative turn to be two sides of the same contradictory entity.Hegel said,in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy,that Dao in Laozi takes nihility and voidness as its supreme essence.If so,Laozi’s philosophy would still be on its most preliminary stage.Being mostly dealt with in Laozi,the concept of Dao,as to its meaningfulness,development and usefulness,is to be approached to in the way from the abstract to the concrete.The first way from the abstract to the concrete is that from Dao to Li( logic),and then to the images and the numbers.If we turn our eye to the social history of human beings,then the first step from the abstract to the concrete will be the development from Dao to De( virtue).Through De,Dao gives its concrete functions and usefulnesses in the social world.De has the same inner contradictions as Dao does.As we can see that the logical development in Laozi from Dao to De,to Ren( benevolence) and Yi( righteousness) and to Li( propriety) is an evolutionary development from one contradiction to another,and this is exactly the development of human history and culture.Each following stage will be an inevitable consequence of its predecessor.Therefore,the development is of necessity and inevitability.It is a great breakthrough in the ancient history of both Chinese and Western philosophies,that Laozi found,from his treatment of the inner contractions in Dao and De,the necessity and inevitability of historical development.
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马克思:自在之物与事物自身之谜的破解——历史唯物主义的构境论阐释 = Marx--Solution to Enigma of Ding an Sich and Sache Selbst: A Situating Interpretation of Historical Materialism / ZHANG Yi-bing
// 南京大学学报(哲学·人文科学·社会科学), Journal of Nanjing University No. 2, 2015 新疆维吾尔自治区乌鲁木齐市 : 语言文字工作委员会 , 2015.5-16+158 pages. 在德国古典哲学中,德语中有细微差异的Ding(物)与Sache(事物)概念在康德与黑格尔的形而上学构境中发生了一种重要的意义突现,它们分别以Ding an sich(自在之物)与Sache selbst(事物自身)的方式颠覆了Ding与Sache的常识语境。这一形而上学思想经费尔巴哈的唯物主义颠倒,到了赫斯那里发展成货币异化论的逻辑基础:赫斯承袭了黑格尔的社会经济现象学批判逻辑,提出人的交往类本质颠倒成了经济事物的观点。青年马克思则超越了赫斯,提出劳动类本质异化的理论。马克思关于康德"自在之物"和黑格尔"事物自身"问题的最终解决实现于历史唯物主义的生成:在现代性生产的历史构境中,康德—黑格尔所指认的那个以一定的形式向我们呈现的物性现象界不是一个理性构架统摄的认知结果,而是由一定的社会实践塑形的历史存在本身,观念世界"向自然的立法"的统觉建构和自我意识感知逻辑只不过是历史性物质实践构形的观念偶像化。
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